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Abstract 
This master’s thesis has explored the topic of main causes that provoked recent financial 
crisis transformed into global one and addressed the issue of bank bailouts application in 
the US that is becoming increasingly discussed and debated subject recently. This thesis has 
reviewed financial statements of four medium-sized commercial banks all located in Georgia 
state, two of which were allowed to fail and the others bailed out, in order to understand 
which specific features were taken into account by the US government to support a bank in 
difficult economic situation. The research concludes that despite high concentration of 
troubled assets in bank loan portfolio and lack of liquidity, well bank capitalization was one 
of the main points that helped banks to receive government support. The thesis is trying to 
show that despite high costs and negative consequences of bailouts, their implementation 
was inevitable to prevent the relapse of the Great Depression.  
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Introduction 
Throughout history, free market societies have gone through boom and bust cycles. While 
everyone enjoys boom sides of the cycles, the downturns are often painful. For almost four 
years the global economic system has been under extraordinary stress. The crisis 
remarkable for the meltdown in real estate market in the US easily spread into almost every 
corner of the globe.  Financial crisis hit in the US in July 2007 forced the US government 
work out possible effective solutions under unprecedented circumstances applying 
traditional and non-traditional monetary policy tools. Finally, the US Treasury  Secretary 
Henry Paulson suggested the plan, named after him “Paulson plan” to bail out a number of 
insolvent banks by acquiring illiquid mortgage-backed securities for roughly 700$ billion in 
order to ensure financial stability, investor confidence and integrity. What made this 
downturn become the most severe financial crisis during the Post World War II era? Ones 
blame the “Loose monetary policy adopted by developed world and, on the other side 
excess savings made by emerging economies”.  Others argue that “Inadequate external and 
internal political regulation”,   “Delinquencies on subprime mortgages, poor risk assessment 
and lack of transparency” made all this happen.  However, we believe the housing market 
bubble is rather a consequence triggered by scant regulation in financial sector and 
macroeconomic imbalances across the world, particularly in income and current account. 
Therefore, we do not tend to consider it to be the cause of the crisis itself.  
The purpose of this thesis is to 
• thoroughly look at main reasons that brought the US to the recession;  
• find out how the government chose the banks that were going to be bailed out by 
analyzing the financial statements of a sample of 4 middle-sized commercial banks; 
• see whether the government had the other options to save the economy, but 
applying bank bailout 
In order to find out what went wrong and when it started we have to carefully examine the 
situation and conditions the world experienced before the collapse. So, in the first chapter 
the US economy overview before the crisis is reviewed and the main causes of crisis are 
discussed. It is reasonable to look through  the past decade trend in such indicators as GDP 
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growth,  housing  prices dynamics and subprime mortgage market figures that closely 
correlate with increase in financial risk and consequently interest rates.   Further, it is worth 
noting that different targets of monetary, fiscal and external policies, usually contradicting 
to each other, adopted by main economic world powers led to  negative trade balances in 
the US, piling up excessive dollar reserves in emerging economies, mainly in China and other 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
The second chapter is showing the volume of bailout scheme through different conventional 
and unconventional channels, envisaging a sample of four medium-sized US commercial 
banks without interstate branches to understand why some banks were failed and the 
others bailed out, what features banks should have possessed to be bailed out. This 
research helps to understand the standard government behavior for bailout selection 
process for all sized banks.  
Now when markets are entirely back on track there are still debates if the bailout option 
was the only right solution, its advantages and disadvantages, and what will be the long run 
consequences not only for financial system, but for the whole economy as well. These 
questions remain open, therefore giving us a chance to discuss them in the third chapter.   
The thesis is finished with the conclusion which is based on the overall thesis review.  
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Chapter 1. The overview of the US economy before the crisis  
 
1.1. Monetary policy and GDP growth 
To start examining the US monetary policy we need initially provide the definition of it. So, 
monetary policy is the process by which the government, central bank or other regulatory 
committee controls the money supply, its availability and cost of money by means of 
regulating interest rate in order to promote the GDP growth and economy stability. The 
Federal Reserve System handles the monetary policy of the US. Usually it is considered that 
the main goal of the US monetary policy is to procure such market sentiment and economic 
conditions, which would allow sustaining stable price levels (reasonable inflation dynamics), 
promoting effective output growth, and maximizing employment at moderate long-term 
interest rates. It is accepted that the expansion of money supply stimulates the economy, 
leading to a more rapid rate of real GDP growth, thus lowering unemployment rate. The 
policy called to the aims aforementioned was utilized to boost the economic growth 
following the dot com crisis in 2001. As a result the monetary policy turned to be too loose; 
interest rates were on record low levels. Federal funds benchmark target rates (federal 
funds rate is an interest rate at which a depository institution lends available funds to 
another depository institution1) were pushed down to 1 % in 2003 (See Chart 1). It means 
that the monetary policy carried out by the FED was aggressively expanding. It can be clearly 
seen from the chart 2 that there is a negative correlation between federal funds rate and 
GDP growth with lag of two quarters or more. (See Chart 2) When federal funds rate is on 
the bottom, the GDP growth is on its peak. In 2003, for instance, the federal funds rate 
reached its peak, while GDP growth experienced significant jump.  Most experts argued that 
there was no chance for the Fed to reanimate the weak and slow economy, but offering 
really cheap money to the market. Concurrently few of them warned that this may result in 
bubble inflation leading to deferred economic downturns.   
 
 
                                                          
1 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp 
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Chart 1. The trend of Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2. Quarterly changes in US Real GDP (1999-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: News Release: Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2009, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, March 
26, 2010 
US authorities actively used tools affecting money supply levels to regulate the pace of 
economic growth, inflation levels and unemployment rates. Observing the downward 
economic trend the Federal Reserve System aggressively applied monetary policy 
instruments to support the economic growth. Excess money supply was finding their 
implication in asset bubble growing. Hence, we can conclude that monetary policy and 
recent crisis are interconnected. Chart 3 clearly shows us that money supply has 
experienced unprecedented upswing during last five decades.   
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Chart 3: Components of US monetary supply (1960 - 2010)2 
 
 
 
 
 
Money supply is the entire amount of money in the economy. M0, M1, M2 and M3 are 
different types of money classifying according to its size and constructed such that each 
subsequent includes the previous. M0 is the most liquid type of money including coins and 
cash + assets held at central bank. M1 consists of the most liquid aggregate + demand 
deposits + similar interest-earning checking accounts, M2 includes saving deposits + non-
institutional money-market funds + small time deposits + retail money market mutual fund 
balances in addition to previous money aggregate. M3 consist of large time deposits + 
institutional money-market funds + short-term repurchase agreement + Eurodollars in 
addition to previous money aggregate.3 
The monetary base, also known as high-powered money (M0), is an important part of the 
money supply since the increase in it leads to a multiple increase in the money supply 
through a multiplier. Knowing that monetary base is expressed as currency in circulation 
(Treasury currency and the Federal Reserve currency) plus reserves4, the decline in reserves 
reflects the increase in currency in circulation.  From Chart 4 it can be seen that the 
monetary base was increasing steadily from 1999. This increase was accompanied by 
growth in GDP. However, from 1996 till 2005 real GDP grew by 59.3 %, or 4.8 % per year, 
                                                          
2 Website of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis  
3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System , “ The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”, 
Washigton DC., Last update: July 5,  2005 p. 22 
4 William T.Gavin, “ More Money:Understanding Recent Changes in the Monetary Base”, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Saint Louis Review, March/April 2009, 91(2), pp.49-59  
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while aggregate M3 increased by 115.9%, or by 8% per year. For 10 years the ratio of 
monetary base to nominal GDP raised to 166.7%.5 
Chart 4: A closer look in to the monetary base dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loose monetary policy pushed loan supply and increased the multiplier. Actually, the excess 
liquidity accumulated within the financial system of the economy was not flowing into the 
consumer sector making real GDP growth more robust. It is worth noting that the money 
supply liquidity indicators M1, M2 and M3 lost their dominance as liquid instruments with 
the introduction of financial derivatives. According to David Roche liquidity pyramid, M1 and 
M2 are on the base of inverted pyramid, comprising only 1% of global liquidity, broad 
money, M3 takes 9%, then securitized debt 10% and 80% accounts for global derivatives6. 
Monetary expansion pumped in more and more liquidity into the balance sheets of banks, 
non-banking institutions and other intermediaries. On their turn banks in the pursuit for 
higher return on assets expanded the borders of “creditworthiness” providing loans and 
credits to individuals and legal entities with poor risk profile. Following this asset prices 
began to react accordingly. The skyrocketed rise in asset prices can be construed as a direct 
outcome of long run monetary expansion. Here, we need to pay great attention to 
expectations and rationale. Credit expansion as it was publicly perceived made the dreams 
                                                          
5 http://www.scriru.com/6/95497475785.php 
6 Independent Strategy, “New Monetarism” , Global markets , 2007 
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come true. Indeed the vast part of investments either led to losses (launching private 
businesses which in many cases are not successful) or brought the virtual return by nominal 
price increase of existed assets. As it was mentioned by Dupor the deviation of asset prices 
from the fundamentals leads to inappropriate investments that diminish the efficiency of 
the economy7. But as long as the banks and financial system keep on making money, they 
do not think much about the circumstances that may threaten economic activity. Before the 
crisis the banks did not want and were not obliged to hold excess reserves with the Fed if 
they could earn an additional return on extra dollar by lending, thus increasing the money 
velocity, real GDP or inflation or both. (MV=PQ), where M=monetary base, V=velocity, the 
number of times each dollar is turned over during the year, P= price of goods and services 
sold during the year, or inflation and Q=the quantity of assets and services sold during the 
year, or real GDP. It can be seen from Chart 5 that the proportion of interbank lending 
among commercial banks to total reserves had positive trend, particularly from 2005 till the 
end of 2007, when the bank reserves started to diminish sharply. Bank Reserve 
requirements are one of the tools of monetary policy which controls the amount of money 
the bank has at disposal. When central bank wants to diminish the amount of money in the 
economy, it increases the reserve requirements and the other way around, if central bank 
wants to boost liquidity in the system.  Bank reserves are amount of money, computed as a 
percentage of deposits, that banks are required to keep in form of vault cash or deposits on 
hand at all times in case of sudden demand for deposit withdrawals . In the end of 2007 the 
interbank lending exceeded the total reserves more than 10 times, but it dropped 
significantly afterwards. The loss of confidence forced banks to hold more reserves at the 
Fed rather than to lend. The credit crunch succeeded cash abundant times. (See Chart 5) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Bill Dupor, “Stabilizing Non-fundamental Asset Price Movements under Discretion and Limited Information”,  
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.52, May, 2005, pp.727-47 
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Chart 5. Interbank lending and reserves in the US, January 1999-November 
2009 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Website 
1.2. Income Inequality 
It is essential to note that the productivity dynamics did not match the one of wages. Stiff 
competition and trade liberalization made corporations and other profit seeking entities 
keep wages constant (thus, change in real wages due to inflation were negative) and 
substitute compatriot employees with hi-tech equipment and cheap labor in the emerging 
countries. The steadily rising wages from the beginning of the 19th century stopped going up 
in the 1970’s, while the prices were growing steadily. Compared to the investment banker 
the average worker has been earning per week 10 times less8. The income inequality is 
much greater in comparison with CEOs and hedge funds managers. To preserve the family 
life standards workers, including middle class had to use their savings and, besides that 
ultimately take more and more debt, using multiple credit cards and loans. Overdrafts and 
other credit tools became main source of financing the excess consumption.  Banks, finance 
corporations, hedge funds and insurance companies came from the supply end for this 
game as the cheap capital available onboard unveiled abysmal opportunities for them. So, it 
is premature to conclude that the rise in consumption was homogeneous among all 
categories of households. To the contrary consumption expansion could be more about the 
                                                          
8 David Cay Jonston, “Average Pay in Investment Banking is Ten Times that Elsewhere”, International herald 
Tribune, September 3, 2007 
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increasing growth of expenditures was not associated with real consumption growth, but 
with the income growth in high-end tier of population, who were trying to earn more return 
on their capital and encouraged credit taking. At the end of the day, cheap credit 
availability, poor risk control and management boosted the demand pushing prices even 
higher with the pace overtaking the one of real disposable income. (See Chart 6) 
Chart 6. The relative dynamics of GDP growth, corporate profits and salaries in the US 
 (in nominal prices for 1947-1997.) 
GDP.  Corporate profits. Salaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: M. Khazin, “Crisis theory”, Report for the conference in Modena, Italy, 9 July 2008 
1.3. Low Savings rate 
Last three decades of US economic history was famous for a sharp fall in saving rates. Chart 
7 displays the dramatic decline in savings rate in comparison with the 1970’s.9  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9http://www.creditwritedowns.com/finance-data/  
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Chart 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.creditwritedowns.com 
Simultaneously, widening budget deficits and rising capital needs required uninterrupted 
financing. The US made it usual to borrow from emerging economies experiencing high 
saving rates utilizing its unique advantage as an issuer of de facto sole reserve currency, US 
Dollar.  This accompanied with loose monetary policy and solid US reputation as a debtor, 
allowed to withstand falling saving rates at home and sustain healthy economic sentiment 
relatively easily weathering out cyclical downturns. Using this privileged position to finance 
domestic aggregate demand resulted in expansion of current account deficit. The scheme 
implemented was of interest for both parties of the game; the US as a debtor, which could 
go ahead with the same economic model lacking changes and strategic reforms 
domestically, thus avoiding any social and political shocks, and emerging countries 
supporting rising exporting potential and allocating amounting huge international reserves.  
Subsequently, the US federal debt amounted to $9 trillion10 in September 2007.  It can be 
concluded that the US economic growth is mostly based on consumption growth as the 
consumption expenditures form about 2/311 of GDP. Daniel Griswold noticed a positive 
correlation between GDP growth and trade deficit: the economic growth in the US was on 
average twice as fast during the years when the US trade deficit was escalating much, 
compared to years when it stagnated or even contracted. The trade deficit accounted for 
                                                          
10 Justin Murray,  Marc Labonte, “Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt”, CRS Report RS22331 
11 http://www.scriru.com/6/95497475785.php 
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only 1.5% of GDP back in 1996 and reached 4.2 % in 200012. Notably, the US displayed 
economic growth during these years. The correlation between these two indicators can be 
explained as follows: the accelerating economic growth fosters the demand on domestic 
production and imports, which unveils new investment opportunities available both for 
domestic and foreign investors. Thus, the economic growth is accompanied by domestic 
investments upswing, higher level of foreign capital inflows and current account deficit. 
1.4. House prices and subprime mortgage market 
The US real estate market started to grow in 1970’s and experienced great jump in house 
prices started in 1999 reaching its peak in 2006 and declined steeply afterwards. The 
inflation adjusted house prices grew approximately by 85% from 2000 till 2006. (See Chart 
8).  
Chart 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The government policy encouraging every American to own a house sowed the seeds of 
recent housing bubble. The great demand for houses and fast growing prices provoked 
investments. The housing market involved different segments of the economy, such as real 
estate, construction, mortgage lending, insurance and etc. Despite the fact that in 2001 the 
IT crisis decreased employment rate, thus inevitably affecting negatively personal 
                                                          
12 Daniel Griswold, “Are trade deficits a Drag on US Economic Growth?” Free Trade Bulletin no 27, March 12, 
2007, Published by Cato’s Center for Trade Policy Studies.  
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disposable incomes, house prices retained the pace. Probably, as one of the reasons we can 
consider the overflow of huge speculative capital from IT sector investments to the fast 
growing housing market. Low interest and mortgage rates following the dot com crisis 
enticed market participants with the real chance to earn fast and easy. Millions of 
consumers started taking on credits and in 5 years blew up the bubble by increasing the 
prices on new and existing homes to median household income by 520% and 475%, 
respectively. For 5 years (2001-2006) the relative house prices grew on average by 30% 
annually, proving the fact that speculative housing bubble was in place, which burst as rates 
went up and the demand could not match the excessive supply anymore. (See Chart 9). 
Chart 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.scriru.com/6/95497475785.php 
Following aspects contributed to the bubble development too. Not everybody had the 
opportunity to take a loan and meet the minimum requirements for a prime mortgage; 
therefore a number of banks offering credits under poor underwriting requirements, where 
borrower’s creditworthiness and solvency were not essential factors, were rising 
significantly. The access given to mortgage loans this way facilitated a substantial rise in the 
potential subprime homeowners’ number and consequently soared housing prices. 
Economic boom, loan incentives from banks and financial institutions led to a formation of 
wrong perceptions. Borrowers were keen to take more mortgages in the hope to refinance 
them at a lower interest rate.  These conditions gave the growth to household debt, the 
proportion of household debt to the annual disposable personal income comprised 127% in 
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2007, whereas in 1990 it was only 77%13. Although households were saving less, 
consumption and borrowing rose year by year. Banks and financial corporations were 
interested in providing the borrowers with subprime loans too. Higher risk profiles paid with 
higher interest.  Subprime mortgage market boom started in late 1990’s has reached record 
highs by 2003. (See Chart 10). The total number of subprime loans grew fivefold from 1998 
till 200314. It is important to note that over the half of total originated subprime loans were 
for cash-refinancing purpose, whereas only one third for house purchases. It means that 
more than 50% of loans were for profit purpose - replacement of the mortgage a person 
owed for more with lower interest rate hence, pocketing the difference (See Chart 11). 
Notwithstanding the fact that in 2002 the delinquency and foreclosure rates on subprime 
credits in contrast to prime loans were 5.5 and 10 times higher, respectively15, credit 
providers didn’t take these alarming figures into consideration and continued inflating 
market with subprime lending. 30 year fixed interest rates on subprime mortgages started 
to decline from 11 % in 1998 to less than 8% in 2003, proving the fact that more favorable 
conditions for subprime borrowers were widespread. Premium above the prime mortgage 
rate, reflection of the risk lender takes by crediting funds to subprime borrower, was used 
to be stable at 2 % level till 2001. Subprime market extension pulled down this premium 
steadily onwards. (See Chart 12). So, the future of relatively new profitable business was 
unknown and uncertain. 
Chart 10 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance 
                                                          
13 Mikhail Khazin,  “Crisis theory”, report for the conference in modena, Italy,  July 9, 2008 
14 Inside B&S Lending 12, “ Subprime Rebound Not Expected any time soon”, December 15, 2007 
15 The Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) report 
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Chart 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 12 
 
 
                  
 
 
 Source: “The Evolution of subprime Mortgage market”, Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis Review,   
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf 
The blooming of the subprime credit, and probably easiness in credit underwriting was 
facilitated by the mortgage-backed market development. Securitization allowed an 
originating company or a bank spread the risk from the loan by selling the securitized credit 
to wide range of investors according to the securitization structure (different tranches with 
different credit ratings and interest payments). Investors in accordance with their risk 
preference were receiving interests and principal payments and bearing the risk only from 
the security, while the bank originating this security backed by the loan had the loan on its 
balance sheet and was responsible for credit risk arising from this asset. Rating agencies 
paid by securities sellers gave high ratings, mostly AAA and AA to most of the structured 
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products, showing no or little risk. The opportunity to disperse risks among market players 
lowered financial asset price volatility stimulating players to take more leverage to buy 
assets increasing both prices and financial securities. Thus, the system was taking more 
risks, which were undervalued, mispriced and unknown. 
As the mass of subprime mortgages increased, the share of total subprime financing 
through mortgage backed market grew even faster. In 2005 the volume of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), which are debt obligations, representing the claims to the cash flows from 
pool of mortgage loans16, reached $3 trillion in a housing mortgage market of $10 trillion17.  
Share of subprime mortgage in the total mortgage market tripled in 6 years by 2007. (See 
Chart 13). Mortgages were provided for 90%18 houses were built; the motivation was to 
drive out the houses as quick as they were erected.  Eventually, development of MBS 
market became more complicated and leveraged bringing to the fore the market for 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), securities which consisted of the group of asset-
backed securities (ABS) and each could be composed of 100 subprime MBS, for example. 
Chart 13 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2008/07/rise-and-fall-of-subprime-mortgage.html 
Recent crisis became remarkable, as the amount of capital engaged was much greater in 
comparison with other crises in past. Dismantling Glass-Steagall Act in the seventies, 
allowed commercial banks to get involved into investment banking activities. This enabled 
                                                          
16 US Securities and Exchange Commission website, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm 
17 Farzad, Roben, M.Goldstein, D.Henry, and C.Palmeri.2007. “Not So Smart.” Business Week 4048: 30-36. 
18 Building Justice Report, “Pulte Homes and Risky Loans. The Hidden Cost of selling New homes”, 2009, p.3 
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banks to significantly expand their functions in comparison with traditional commercial 
banking. Rising income from investment banking activities proved to be more profitable due 
to higher risk. But banks merely ignored those risks and kept on the same trend.  Many 
nonbank financial institutions, such as investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, 
pension funds, insurance companies became major players on the financial market with 
much larger portion of combined capital than that of traditional banks.  Traditional banks 
were connected with these nonfinancial institutions with credit and trading lines, repos. 
Therefore, in comparison with other great crises, the recent crisis involved much greater 
volume of capital within the interconnected market system which made it a mortal danger 
to let those institutions fail altogether. It soon became obvious that market needs 
interference in order not to ruin itself.    
Housing market was misbalanced, supply exceeded the demand significantly, real sign of 
market overheating. Investments made failed to pay back, demand squeezed and credit 
terms worsened. The chance to refinance easily and nearly for free disappeared. Interest 
rates climbed rapidly up. So did mortgage premiums. These factors led to difference in 
market housing prices and mortgage loans, making the latter less attractive. As foreclosure 
rate started growing significantly the loss confidence in the housing market caused 
momentous losses and defaults on other types of credits. At the end of the day housing 
crisis expanded further affecting the entire economy. 
1.5. China and the US 
China’s cheap labor became its core advantage on the global competition scene. Goods and 
services produced in China made it possible to match rising consumption in advanced 
economies, while China itself being a pure export-orientated country reached 8-10% annual 
GDP growth rates. High GDP growth rates were stipulated by rapidly growing export. 
Foreign direct investments by transnational companies and government outlays in key 
industries made China a leading contributor to global growth. However, household 
consumption declined from 46% of GDP in 2000 to 36% in 2006, mostly due to fall in total 
labor income, which fell from 50% of GDP to 37% during the same period and rise in 
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investments from 35 to 43% and share of export from 23% to 37%19. Net export rose sharply 
from 2.3% to 7.5%.  
According to the statistics one of the biggest trading partners of China is the US. China’s 
trading with the US accounts for more than one third of export. Consumption in America 
was growing steadily over the years. China implemented cheap currency policy, which was 
devaluing Yuan or renminbi further against the US dollar, making export much more 
attracted and the volume of export larger. The Chinese economy was growing at 10% pace, 
while the US five times less (according to the indicators before the crisis, 2006). The growth 
targeting associated with low interest rates in the US attracted a great amount of funds 
from the emerging tiger. There is a belief that China’s overheated economy contributed to 
the financial crisis in the US: the inflow of Chinese funds during 2002-2004 obtained easy 
access to the credit market and fueled housing bubble.  However, it is misleading to think 
that China’s excessive production contributed to turmoil in the US; the demand is creating 
the supply and China has been satisfying this continuing demand. Even if, China would have 
stopped exporting to the US, the US would have found the other emerging partner as its 
consumers used to live beyond their means. In 2007 the US balance of payment deficit 
comprised $790 billion, making the US the largest sovereign debtor in the world20. Thus, two 
big powers, the US on the one hand and China on the other were experiencing the trade 
deficit and trade surplus respectively, deepening the global macroeconomic imbalances and 
ultimately resolving in financial crisis. By accounting definition the current account surpluses 
in some countries should be reflected by current account deficit in others, thus globally the 
balance should neutral. However, they are not balanced in the real world, creating 
imbalances. It is important to note that in comparison with Germany and Japan, for 
example, where it can be noticed trade surplus with the US as well, the share of export is 
not as high as with China. The US has a huge debt, while China’s enormous international 
reserves, amounting for $1 trillion in 2006 or  about 22%21 of the world’s reserves out of 
                                                          
19NBS. National Bureau of statistics of China. 2007 and previous years. The China Statistical yearbook.  
20 US DOC, US Department of the Treasury, US ITC 
21 IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), September 28, 2007; 
Lim, Mah-Hui, M.2008. “Old Wine in a New Bottle: Subprime Mortgage Crisis-Causes and Consequences.” 
Working Paper no.532, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute. 
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which $699 billion22 or more than 50% are invested in the US securities (US Treasury debt, 
US corporate debt (some of them are asset-backed), US agency debt (issued by government 
sponsored enterprise or federal agencies) and US equities (stocks)); the US over-
consumption has been building up the economy growth in China as a result of export, 
hoarding the positive trade balance and investing in the US treasuries, allowing the US to 
expand its over spending: the growing consumption in the US was supported by China’s 
lending to private and public sectors, making the countries too interdependent. 
Chinese Central Bank’s risk-averse investments in low-yielding Treasury securities comprised 
up to $406 billion in the end of 2007 or 17.2%23 of total foreign holdings of the US Treasury 
securities, putting China on the second place in the world behind Japan. The US Treasury 
securities are issued to finance the federal budget deficit. This fact indicated that China was 
committed to long-term involvement in American and global economy.  
However, the US trade deficit with China soared due moving of East Asian investments to 
China instead of the US market. This propelled by cheap exporting fuelled those imbalances 
to widen. The trade redirection resulted in China’s deficit with East Asia. Although the trade 
with the rest of the world (Europe, Canada and Mexico) increased twice in almost ten years, 
China accounts for one third of the US trade deficit. (See the Chart 14).  
Chart 14                       Composition of the US Global Trade deficit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 US Treasury Department, Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of US Securities as of June 30, 2006. 
 
23 http://ncseonline.org/nle/crs/abstract.cfm?NLEid=1949 
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The US export to China and import from it in percentage terms were growing steadily, while 
the volume of import was on average 5 times more than export, creating huge current 
account deficit in the US. (See table 1) 
 
The US deficit was different through the years. It can be noticed a small trade surplus in 
1991, before the deficit growth. (See Chart 15) 
Chart 15 
         
Source: US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
US trade deficit influenced financial markets through payment mechanism. The US import is 
paid by crediting the foreign exporters with dollar balances in the US bank accounts, and 
then the exporters exchange the dollar amount of money in domestic currency, creating 
demand for them. Compared to other developed countries, Germany or Japan, for example, 
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the Chinese government intervenes in currency markets and buys dollar inflows to prevent 
the Yuan revaluation. Since the dollar credit balances in a bank account give smaller returns, 
Chinese exporters prefer to invest in the US securities (private holdings of the US Securities) 
acquiring all types of them, issued by the US government and other financial institutions, 
such as CDO, ABS, for example, where the returns and risks are high. The motivation 
standing behind this export revenues reinvestment is safety and financial market 
development in comparison with their domestic markets. The hope and belief in the US 
economy as the most powerful country in the world, with no default risk, attracted more 
and more liquidity into the US markets, inflating bubbles one after the other. The excess 
liquidity and the ongoing demand for the financial securities became higher than issuers’ 
and holders’ expected to take out of the market, rising prices into the sky; the rise in 
security prices steered up the asset value, inflating the latter; the rising asset prices allowed 
people to borrow more against the rising prices of the asset, mainly houses.  In 2005-2006 
the households’ consumption in the US comprised 33 % of GDP growth24.  Thus, it can be 
seen how the US overconsumption and deficit transmitted the risks to subprime market and 
boosted the bubble.  
So, above we have specified different but interdependent of each other US macroeconomic 
conditions that reached the peak of their impossibility of co-existence and separated at the 
seams resulting in the crisis. The period of deep economic freeze overtook the US as 
negative effects of financial sector spread to real economy: lending and credit activities 
shrank sharply, foreclosures and unemployment rates started to increase. The emergent 
measures needed to be taken to stop the economy collapse. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Lim, Mah-Hui, M.2008. “Old Wine in a New Bottle: Subprime Mortgage Crisis-Causes and Consequences.” 
Working Paper no.532,Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute. 
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Chapter 2. The volume of bailouts, bailout selection based on 
empirical analysis of 4 medium-sized commercial banks  
 
2.1. Conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools during the crisis. 
The continuing contraction of lending became more severe as the crisis unfolded. In reply to 
lending reduction, the Fed had to undertake the extraordinary measures manipulating 
traditional monetary policy tools as well as an array of targeted credit programs to assist in 
returning confidence and liquidity to the financial sector. The initial steps of the traditional 
monetary tools to expand lending was lowering the federal funds rate target to almost zero 
percent and printing money by the Fed to distribute them to a number of banks charging 
the discount rate, which is a negative real interest rate. Usually the discount interest rate is 
used overnight, but with the introduction of Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (FRTAF) 
the borrowing period was prolonged from 1 to 3 months. When the crisis struck, the 
negative interest rate became comparable to subsidy submitted to the financial sector for 
the period of 10 years and more. The money printed by FED was considered to be returned 
when the financial system recovers; it means that the period and the interest rate were 
unspecified. However, the application solely traditional monetary tools did not bring its 
expected results, as the destroyed confidence and rising fear of bankruptcy of the financial 
participants impeded their work and lead the financial market to “liquidity trap”. Liquidity 
trap is a situation when further interest rate cut is impossible (because the nominal interest 
rate is almost zero) and the economy is not stabilized. Expansion monetary policy with near 
zero interest rate did not work during the Great Depression and led to liquidity trap25 as 
well. Based on past experience the Fed could have started to use earlier new facilities for 
lending resuming instead of lowering the interest rate further. In the end, the Fed had to 
create new lending facilities to provide the financial market players, depository and 
nondepository financial institutions with liquidity. The Fed initiated the following facilities : 
The primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Term Securities lending Facility (TSLF)- to supply 
the primary dealers with short-term liquidity, The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF)- to relieve the liquidity problems of money market funds; The Commercial Paper 
                                                          
25 Miguel Almunia, Benetrix Augustin, Barry Eichenengreen, Kevin O’Rourke, G.Rua “ Grom Great Depression to 
Great Credit Crisis: Similarities, Differences and Lessons”, November, 2009 
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Funding Facility (CPFF)- to assist in issuing of the commercial paper by purchasing highly 
rated offerings; The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)- to stimulate the 
issuance of asset-backed securities and so enhance the accessibility of credit to households 
and business. The total amount of cash, channeled through these facilities (excluding TSLF, 
because the given facility used securities instead of cash), comprised to 400$ billion26 in 
November 2008. Besides, the government (Treasury Department, Federal Insurance Deposit 
Corporation and Federal Reserve) provided an additional support to Bear Stearns, AIG, 
Citigroup and Bank of America, the important financial institutions whose failures were 
considered to be a serious threat to the financial system’s stability. The assets of Federal 
Reserve banks increased substantially from the middle of year 2008 mainly because of loans 
given to depository, nondepositary institutions, lines of credit to Bear Stearns and AIG, 
agency debts. (See Chart 16).  The assistance was mainly in the form of credit lines, 
guarantees on certain assets and Maiden Lane I, II, III facility creation.  Maiden Lane facility 
created to facilitate Bear Stearns and AIG transactions, was structured as a limited liability 
company (in contrast to corporation, the limited liability company does not bear the 
personal liabilities for debts in case of losses) with Federal Reserve funds necessary to 
purchase MBSs, ABSs, CDOs and other mortgage-related assets from Bear Sterns (Maiden 
lane I) and AIG (Maiden Lane II and III). In other words, the Fed exchanged portfolios of risky 
securities to an equal in fair value terms principal amounts of the loans. To prevent the 
financial consequences triggered by the failure of the investment banks Bear Stearns, the 
Fed in agreement with the Treasury decided to extend funding to Bear Stearns through JP 
Morgan Chase& Company in order to assist the former in solving its financial problems. JP 
Morgan Chase& Company, as the acquirer of Bear Stearns in June 2008 could not absorb 
400$billion27 of bear Stearns portfolio, hence the Fed created Maiden Lane I facility to help 
to arrange the issue with mortgage-related assets, amounted to 30$28 billion. The Maiden 
Lane’s assets comprises 29$ billion from Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 1$ billion 
                                                          
26 Congressional Budget Office “The Budgetary Impact and Subsidy Costs of the Federal Reserve’s Actions 
During the Financial Crisis”, May 2010, p.10 
27 Congressional Budget Office “ The Budgetary Impact and Subsidy Costs of the Federal Reserve’s Actions 
During the Financial Crisis”, May 2010, Appendix A, p.31 
28 Congressional Budget Office “ The Budgetary Impact and Subsidy Costs of the Federal Reserve’s Actions 
During the Financial Crisis”, May 2010, p.10 
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from JP Morgan Chase29 being the latter responsible for the first 1$ billion losses of Maiden 
Lane I.  
Chart 16 
 
 
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) enacted in order to bailout the US financial 
system in October 2008 was also one of the ways of assisting the financial sector.  After long 
negotiations with the Congress, the US Treasury has gradually injected 700$ billion into the 
banking sector by purchasing the troubled assets, especially real estate and mortgage-
related assets. However, the financial assistance was distributed only to the selected banks. 
Out of about 9441 30 banks in the US only selected banks were included into the TARP. The 
                                                          
29 Congressional Budget Office “The Budgetary impact and Subsidy costs of the federal reserve’s actions during 
the financial crisis” May 2010,  Appendix A, p.31 
30 Andrea M. Maechler and Kathleen M. McDill, “Dynamic Deposito Discipline in US Banks, Working paper 
2003-2007, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/wp2003_07/index.html# 
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participation in the bailout program was based on Capital-Assets-Management Equity-
Liability (CAMEL) ratings and the criteria “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to fail”. 
CAMEL rating sorted the banks into 5 classes, giving the high probability to rescue if a bank 
was in the first group and less chances to that which was in the fifth one.  
The financial assistance accounted about 15$ trillion or 90% 31 of the US GDP in 2008 was 
mainly distributed by the Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Committee (FDIC) and Joint Programs. The bailout was transmitted through 
different types of subsidization, such as direct and indirect loans, guarantees, General 
Backing and Subsidization, Government Security Enterprise’s (GSE’s) and Ginnie Mae, 
expansion of credit or existing methods and guarantees, international liquidity swaps and 
market interventions, general Federal Reserve Capital Requirements. (See Chart 17). The 
expenditures on recent bailout were far greater than all combined major US expenditures. 
(See Chart 18). 
Figure17
 
                                                          
31Barry Ritholtz “ Bailout Costsvs big Historical Events”, June 18, 2009 
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/bailout-costs-vs-big-historical-events/, Deroy Murdock “Bailout 
Exceeds 90Percent of 2008 US GDP”, June 6, 2009 http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=31343 
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Chart 18. 
Comparison analysis of the recent US bailout and the major US expenditures 
 
Source: Barry Ritholtz, “Bailout Costs vs Big Historical Events”, June 18, 
2009http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/bailout-costs-vs-big-historical-events/ 
 
30 
 
Top recipients of the federal support were the financial institutions with significant 
operations, such as Citigroup, AIG, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, 
Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley and big companies in automotive industry General Motors, 
GMAC, Chrysler Holding, Chrysler Financial, namely. (See Chart 19). Since it was impossible 
to rescue all of them, many financial institutions were failed, taken over and merged. 
Chart 19 
 
Source: Nomi Prins, “It takes Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses and backroom Deals from Washington to 
Wall Street” Supplemental Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, 2009 
Citigroup was one of main recipients of the federal assistance. It can be seen from the chart 
above that in total Citigroup received 409, 9$ billion of government support including 301$32 
billion of government guarantee in loans from the Treasury and the FDIC and securities in 
return to 27$ billion33 of preferred shares and warrants to acquire stock. The government 
obtained the major say in the company’s banking operations. Nevertheless the received 
bailout money Citigroup was experiencing the serious trouble as the subprime mortgage 
market was unfolding, revealing more losses and jobs cutting. The company’s stock market 
                                                          
32 Nomi Prins, “It takes Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses and backroom Deals from Washington to Wall 
Street” Supplemental Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p.6 
33 http://citigroup.co.tv/ 
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fell from 244$ billion in 2006 to 6$ billion in November 200834. Citigroup could repay only 
part (41,2$billion) of the aid given by the government and the rest was converted to 
common shares. The government became an equity stake owner of 36%35 of Citigroup 
Company. 
The Federal support to AIG was channeled through different ways: a line of credit, the 
Securities Borrowing Facility, Maiden II and Maiden III, TARP, loan to AIG subsidiaries and 
preferred stock interests, in total comprising to 254.6$ billion. The initial agreement of the 
Fed to lend AIG was 85$ billion to help the entity to cover its obligations and sell some of its 
businesses with the least possible distortions to the overall economy; in return the 
government received warrant for 79.9% percent in equity stake and the right to veto the 
dividends payments to common and preferred shareholders36. The further problems in the 
company required Fed to create the Securities Borrowing Facility, lending up to 38$ billion 
in return to the debt securities with investment-grade rating. Investment-grade securities 
are the securities with relatively low risk of default. Taking into consideration market 
stability, federal government and taxpayers interests, the help to AIG insurance company 
was modified and Treasury purchased 40$billion37 through TARP program in exchange for 
newly issued preferred stocks allowing the Fed to reduce the original emergency credit line 
of 85$ billion to 60$ billion38. At the same time the Fed reorganized its lending to AIG by 
creating Maiden Lane II LLC and Maiden Lane III LLC.  Maiden Lane II got a loan of 22.5$ 
billion from the Fed and 1$ billion from AIG (subordinated loan- repaid after the Fed’s loan) 
in order to purchase residential mortgage backed securities from AIG. This facility allowed 
AIG to repay in full the Securities Borrowing Facility. Maiden lane III LLC obtained 30$ billion 
from the Fed and 5$ billion from AIG39 (also subordinated loan). This action allowed AIG to 
terminate the CDS (credit default swaps) contracts. Besides, AIG received the second round 
                                                          
34 Dash, Eric, Creswell, Julie  “Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as it Made Bolder Bets” Business (The New York 
Times) November 22, 2008. 
35 Citigroup website, http://citigroup.co.tv/ on May 2011 
36 Baird Webel, “Ongoing Government Assistance for American International Group (AIG), Congressional 
Research service, March 16, 2009, p.4 
37 Sorkin, Andrew Ross, Mary Williams Walsh “ US Provides More Aid to Big Insurer”, New York Times, 
November 10, 2008  
38 The Congree of the United States, Congressional Budget Office “The Budgetary impact and Subsidy costs of 
the federal reserve’s actions during the financial crisis”, May 2010, Appendix A 
 
39 Congressional Budget Office, “The Budgetary impact and sbsidy costs of the federal reserve’s actions during 
the financial crisis”, May 2010, Appendix A. 
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financial aid from TARP in amount of 29, 8$billion, loan to its life insurance subsidiaries and 
preferred stock interests.  
Bank of America also received the federal assistance through TARP program (45$ billion in 
total) in the beginning of year 2009 in return to preferred stocks, obtained an assets 
guarantee of 118$ 40billion and got 5.2$ billion of bailout money through AIG41 . Bank of 
America could resume lending and improve its financial conditions faster as it can be seen 
from Chart 19 the Bank could almost repay the bailout in the end of 200942. 
JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo each got 25$ billion, GMAC Financial Services received 
17$ billion43, the other banks and automotive companies obtained less amount of money, 
whilst others nothing.  
The measures taken by the government to assist the financial sector mentioned above were 
the solely response to the subprime mortgage crisis, that turned into the global financial 
crisis. This federal support was vital, as the investor loss of confidence in the US credit 
markets, the failure of the whole US financial system and the probability of repeating the 
Great Depression were growing substantially.  
2.2. Research of 4 commercial banks 
The first part of this chapter demonstrated the volume of bailout money that was directed 
to restore stability in the financial sector. However, as the crisis hit the banking sector, many 
banks experienced runs at the same time but not all banks that experienced difficult 
financial conditions were helped. So, it is interesting to know how the government selected 
the banks for bailout purpose. What were the main financial indicators the government 
looked at?  The research of 4 middle-sized commercial banks will try to answer this 
question. It is worth noting that a sample of 4 banks is not a representative of the whole 
                                                          
40 Charlotte, N.C., “Bank of America to repay Entire 45$ billion in TARP to US Taxpayers”, bank of Amrica 
website,  November 2, 2009. 
41 Walsh, Mary Williams, “AIG Lists Firms It paid With Taxpayer Money”, The New York Times, March 31, 2009 
42 Nomi Prins, “It takes Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses and backroom Deals from Washington to Wall 
Street” Supplemental Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p.7. 
43 John Dunbar, David Donald, “The roots of the Financial Crisis: Who’s to Blame?”, The center for Publicity, 
May 6, 2009, p.3. 
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economy, so, the results obtained from the research do not necessarily mean that the 
government applied these indicators to all banks.  
We took the banks in our sample from the Georgia state, located in the southeastern United 
States, which suffered the greatest amount of bank runs since 2007. The concentration of 
many small banks tied mainly to real estate lending were seriously affected by the crisis 
putting Georgia on the first rank in bank failures among the states. It is claimed that many 
small and medium sized banks in Georgia put money heavily on real estate development 
loans and therefore, lost greatly when the mortgage market collapsed. The amount of bank 
bankruptcies reached 4544 in Georgia by the end of 2010. Among the collapsed financial 
entities some were bailed out, the others acquired by larger market players and some were 
left without a buyer. To understand why some banks were bailed out and bought while the 
others were forced to go to the bottom needs to examine the sample of banks allowed to 
fail and those that have already overcome the serious economic times and continue its 
operations till present.  What specific bank features and bank indicators were taken into 
consideration when the issue of bailout was raised? The answer to this question will be 
based on the research of 4 commercial medium sized banks, 2 failed and 2 not failed, all 
located in the same state, Georgia, mainly involved in commercial lending and with almost 
the same number of employees. Two banks that failed and could not find their bidders are 
Rockbridge Commercial Bank and Community Bank of West Georgia; the other two are 
Georgia Primary Bank and One Georgia Bank. Three banks are regulated by Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and one of them – by Federal Reserve System. (See Appendix 1 
for explanation why some banks are regulated by FDIC and some by Fed) The financial 
parameters and requirements that we are going to examine are identically employed by 
both banking agencies. (See Appendix 2 for further explanation). We decided to envisage 
the sample of medium sized banks with 1 office known mainly within Georgia with no 
interstate branches and foreign offices for the reason that medium sized banks are more 
transparent in its operations and not so complex in analyzing than larger ones, as smaller 
financial institutions do not have subsidieries and foreign branches which affect the financial 
statement. Therefore, based on the research made for medium sized banks we can derive 
                                                          
44 http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/20/tracking-bank-failures-georgia-tops-list-of-hardest-hit-states/ 
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the conclusion which criteria were essential for being bailed and extrapolate the results to 
larger entities and prove that the bailouts were indispensable.  
To start with we will discuss the banks that were failed and then those that were bailed out. 
As the banks will be discussed in order of its value assets, the first bank out of failed ones is 
Rockbridge Commercial bank and second is Community Bank of West Georgia; out of 
supported banks the first is Georgia Primary Bank and the second One Georgia Bank. 
Rockbridge Commercial Bank 
First of all we need to perform the bank history and its key financial indicators. So, 
Rockbridge Commercial Bank was founded in 2006 as a state-chartered nonmember bank 
regulated and insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with one branch in 
an office park in Georgia. It stopped its operations and was closed in December 2009 with 
294$ million value of its assets, 292$ million of liabilities and the estimated loss to Deposit 
Insurance Fund (DIF) 45of 122, 1$46 million.  When no acquirer was found for this bank, the 
Georgia Department of Banking and Finance (GDBF) let FDIC assume Rockbridge and 
dispense of its 294$ million assets as receiver. Rockbridge Commercial Bank became the 
25th47 bank in the state that had to stop functioning in the wake of financial downturn. 
Below is given the table with bank balance sheet and key ratios excerpt as of September 30, 
2009 and historical ( from 2006-2008) trend of total assets, liabilities and capital. 
 
                                                          
45 All DIF member banks are also members of the FDIC. Each depositor is insured by the FDIC to at least 
250,000$. All deposits above the FDIC insurance amount are insured by the Depositors Insurance Fund (DIF) 
(https://www.difxs.com/DIF/Home.aspx) 
46 Office of inspector General “ Material Loss review Rockbridge Commercial Bank, Atlanta Georgia”, report № 
MLR-10-041, p. I-4, http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports10/10-041.pdf 
47 Peralte C.Paul, “RockBridge Commercial Bank closed by regulators”, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
Atlanta Business News, December 18, 2009. 
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Source: http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_3441426, 
http://www.faqs.org/banks/RockBridge-Commercial-Bank-58315-Atlanta-Georgia.html#top 
It can be seen from the table that total equity was on very low level, meaning that loans and 
leases were unable to be covered in case of further losses, the bank equity capital 
comprised 0.07% of bank loans. The loan loss allowance in its term was small enough, only 
2.5%, to cover the massive defaults on loans, despite the fact the loan allowance and loan 
loss provision was growing parallel to the growth of risky real estate loans. The low level of 
capital was provoked by cash diverting from capital reserves to back up rising losses during 
the crisis. The capital equity of 26.5$48 million for December 31, 2008 was used to backstop 
                                                          
48 Data is taken from banks’ financial statement, Schedule RI A Changes in Equity Capital 
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the net losses attributable to bank in year 2009, leaving the bank with total equity capital of 
1.534$ million. With such extensive losses it is reasonable to see whether a bank’s capital 
and earnings were substantial to absorb the impact of further losses. Representative 
indicators of capital adequacy are “Tier 1 leverage ratio”, “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” 
and “Total risk-based capital ratio”. According to banking agency regulatory definitions 
(Basel II Capital Accord “Calculation of Tier 1 capital and total qualifying capital”, March 30, 
2006,http://www.federalreserve.gov/GeneralInfo/Basel2/DraftNPR/NPR/section_4.htm) 
“Tier 1 leverage ratio” measures the relationship of Tier 1 capital, which calculated as sum 
of capital stock, reserves and retained earnings minus intangible assets and deferred tax 
assets, to quarterly average total assets. This indicator reflects how well bank equity capital 
funds total bank assets. For well-capitalized banks the leverage ratio should be at least 5% 
and more, for adequately capitalized at least 4%, undercapitalized 3% and below 3% 
significantly undercapitalized. “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” measures the relation of Tier 1 
risk-based capital to bank’s risk-weighted assets.  To be classified as well- capitalized a bank 
must have a “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” of 6% or more, adequately capitalized rank is 
given to entities with at least 4% “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” below 4 % and below 3% is 
graded as undercapitalized and significantly undercapitalized banks respectively. “Total risk-
based capital ratio” is a sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital (Tier 2 capital includes 
supplementary capital items such as general loan loss reserves, subordinated debt, other 
preferred stock and convertible debt capital) must equal to 10% or more for well-
capitalized, for adequately capitalized at least 8% or more, undercapitalized at least 6% and 
less than 4%- significantly undercapitalized. Rockbridge had a “Tier 1 leverage ratio” and 
“Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” and “Total Risk-based Capital ratio” of 0.42%, 0.32% and 
0.83% respectively, meaning that the bank is critically undercapitalized. A private equity 
company “FIG partners LLC” specializing in buyout investments considered Rockbridge at 
the end of quarter to be the least capitalized bank in Georgia. The significant growth of 
assets and the rising losses used so much of Rockbridge capital pushing the bank far below 
the regulatory capital requirements and no longer permitted it to operate independently. 
The negative profitability ratios, such as Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
prove the fact that the bank was unprofitable relative to its assets and equity, or inefficient 
to use its assets and equity to generate further earnings. The substantial risks of 
unanticipated earnings and capital volatility were posed by real estate loan concentration in 
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the period of mortgage market downswing. To see how liquid bank’s assets were we need 
to use one of the liquidity ratios. We tend to think that for banks it is better to use quick 
ratio as it does not count inventories as current assets. For companies quick ratio= Cash + 
Accounts receivables + Short-term Investments, for banks we use the following accounts: 
(cash+ securities)/short-term deposits (one year or less). So, the quick ratio for Rockbridge 
Commercial Bank was (30.596$+20.108$)/233.079$49=0.22, meaning that the bank was 
unable to pay its deposits. A large number of banks were experiencing scant liquidity at the 
period of crisis, because they considered mortgage-backed securities as liquid in boom 
period, instead of government bonds. The normal ratio should be above 1 or around 1. The 
computation of quick ratio for River City Bank and Greater Rome Bank was 1 and 1.13 
respectively. The mentioned above banks are also middle-sized banks and located in 
Georgia State and could overcome the crisis without government help, so, we take their 
liquidity ratios as an indicators of well-managed bank.  
Financial Condition of Rockbridge Commercial Bank 
 
Source: Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR) and Reports of Examination (ROE) 
 
From the table above it can be seen the growth of bank’s loan portfolio, by the end of 2006 
it had 29$ million in deposits and only 7.2$50 million in loans, while by the end of 2009 its 
loan portfolio rocketed to 211$ million. According to bank balance sheet data of 2009 
(Schedule RCCI part I. loans and leases) out of 211$ million 152.9$ million or 72% were in 
real estate developments loans and in commercial real estate loans, only 44 $ million or 21% 
in commercial and industrial loans and the rest in other loans. The initial focus of Rockbridge 
bank was in traditional industrial and commercial lending. However, when Rockbridge bank 
entered the market in 2006, the mortgage market was on its peak, so the bank board and 
                                                          
49 The data is taken from  bank financial statement “Schedule RC E Deposit Liabilites”, Memoranda. 
50Office of inspector General “ Material Loss review Rockbridge Commercial Bank, Atlanta Georgia”, report № 
MLR-10-041, p. I-4, http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports10/10-041.pdf 
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management team consistent with rapid growth strategy desired to hit the jackpot by 
concentrating the portfolio heavily on real estate lending developments. But, the 
management’s aggressive lending strategy was ill-timed and based of insufficient financial 
information, as the mortgage market started to deteriorate drastically by the beginning of 
year 2007. It can be seen from the table provided below that original business plan 
anticipated a mix of ADC, 1-4 family residential, CRE , C&I and consumer loans. The greater 
share of loans was planning to distribute under consumer and industrial loans (50%) and 
less to ADC (5%), however, Rockbridge Commercial bank which was required to operate 
within the parameters of original business plan approved by FDIC deviated from it 
significantly.  
Rockbridge Proposed and Actual Loan Mix over time. 
 
ADC- Acquisition, Development, and Construction, CRE- Commercial Real Estate, C&I – Commercial 
and Industrial 
Source: Office of inspector General “ Material Loss review Rockbridge Commercial Bank, Atlanta 
Georgia”, report № MLR-10-041, p. I-4, http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports10/10-041.pdf 
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Composition of Rockbridge Loan Portfolio (%) Year End 2006 to 2009 
   
It can be observed from the chart above the growth pattern of loan portfolios of Rockbridge 
Bank during the years of its existence. The share of real estate loans took initially a slightly 
more than 50% out of loan portfolio and this share was increased to 2/3 by the end of year 
2009. It can be concluded that the management team did not properly monitor 
concentrations of portfolio and react inadequately by continuing expanding lending strategy 
toward the mortgage market. 
According to financial release Rockbridge had some lending activities connected with 
aircraft industry, totaled to 31$ million or 12% of total loans. However, the bank employees 
did not possess appropriate experience or training in order to underwrite and evaluate 
aircraft lending properly, hence, it is justified why roughly 15 % of the aircraft loans resulted 
in a loss. Even though 15% loss represents not a significant figure out of total losses, it 
proving the fact that a high proportion of loans resulted in a loss caused by poor 
underwriting standards, weak management’s oversight and Board’s ineffective institution 
protection from losses. 
Besides, based on Reports of Examinations conducted by FDIC the bank’s performance was 
evaluated according to CAMELS (“S” stands for Sensitivity to market risk) rating and was 
increasingly deteriorating year by year. By the end of 2008, the bank’s overall composite 
rating performance was reduced from “1” to “3” out 5 scores and graded as needed 
improvement or risk management practices. In September 2009, FDIC examined the 
performance of Rockbridge and Reports of Examinations noted that the bank was insolvent 
and the overall conditions were poor, Capital- inadequate; Assets- deficient because of ACD 
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and CRE loan concentration; Management – poor performance; Earnings- deficient in a 
result of poor asset quality; Liquidity – deficient; Sensitivity to market risk – inadequate. 
Each component was graded “5” making the overall rating “5”. 
Thus, we can make an overall conclusion of Rockbridge failure: a high focus on real estate 
loans based on non-core funding; the level of capital was eroded by rising losses; strong 
deviation from the original business plan without proper internal control to mitigate 
corresponding arising risks, poor credit underwriting standards and inadequate reaction of 
Board and management team to the occuring changes in the real estate market. These 
shortages were exacerbated by the worsening economic conditions in real estate market. It 
is understandable why the bank could not find a buyer, no entity wanted to acquire the 
Rockbridge that had only massive debts and poor performance of portfolio difersification. 
Had the bank had the significant proportion of investments in sectors other than real estate 
market, it could have been acquired.  
 
Community Bank of West Georgia 
The bank started its operations in 2003, when there was a beginning of housing boom rising, 
with 31 employees and one branch office. West Georgia was closed in June 26, 2009 with 
total assets 201$ million and total deposits 189$ million by the Georgia Department of 
Banking and Finance. West Georgia was a state chartered member bank supervised by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta under the authority given from both the Board of Federal 
Reserve System and the Georgian Department of Banking and Finance. As no bidder was 
located the FDIC was named as receiver to insure depositors by mailing checks. The failure 
of Community Bank of West Georgia (further West Georgia) was the 41st51 bank failure in 
the states and 8th52 bank failure in state Georgia since crisis occurred. The West Georgia 
failure brought to Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) the estimated loss of 85.1$53 million or 
42.3% of total assets. Below are presented the part of bank’s balance sheet with key 
                                                          
51 Wallace Witkowski “ Community Bank of West Georgia fails”, Market Watch, June 26, 2009, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/community-bank-of-west-georgia-fails 
52 Press Releases “ FDIC Approves the Payout of Insured Deposits of Community Bank of West Georgia, Villa 
Rica, Georgia”, June 26, 2009, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09101.html 
53 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community Bank of West 
Georgia”, Office of Inspector General,  January 2010, p. 9 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/MRL_west_Georgia.htm 
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financial ratios as of March 31, 2009 and the trend of assets, liabilities and capital growth 
from 2003-2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_3119163, 
http://www.faqs.org/banks/Community-Bank-of-West-Georgia-57436-Villa-Rica-Georgia.html#top 
Total bank equity capital comprised 5.6% out of loan portfolio meaning that loans were 
mainly funded because of deposits. The small part of equity capital was not enough to cover 
the losses associated with loans. However, this indicator is higher in comparison with 
Rockbridge bank. According to the data of bank’s change in equity capital, West Georgia 
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experienced significant losses started in the end of 2007, at that time its capital was twice as 
high (15,087$million54)that it was at failure. For the period of slightly more than one year 
the equity capital was decreasing gradually in order to compensate the rising losses. The 
decreasing in capital was partially provoked by the increase in loan loss provision expense 
that increased 78355 times in one year.  The chart below demonstrates this increase. 
Impact of Provision Expense on Earnings 
 
Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community Bank of 
West Georgia”, Office of Inspector General, January 2010, p.13, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/West_Georgia_Bank_total-final-report_web.pdf 
Tier 1 leverage ratio is slightly less than the least required ratio of 4% to be adequately 
capitalized, so, the bank is undercapitalized; Tier 1 Risk-based capital ratio satisfied the 
requirement to be adequately capitalized, whereas Total Risk-based capital ratio did not. 
Therefore, the bank was placed in group of “critically undercapitalized”. Negative net 
income resulted in negative ratios of ROA and ROE. Quick ratio liquidity indicator equaled 
(cash+ government securities)/short-term deposits = (21.764$ million+17.9$ 
                                                          
54 Data is from  bank’s financial statement, Schedule RI A change in Equity Capital, 
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/viewreport.aspx?ibnid=usa_3119163&per=20080331&rpt=RIA&
typ=html 
55 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community Bank of West 
Georgia”, Office of Inspector General,  January 2010, p. 9 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/MRL_west_Georgia.htm 
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million)/144.51556$ million =0.27, showing that bank was not able to cover its short-term 
liabilities. 
As it was mentioned above, West Georgia launched its business in the beginning of real 
estate flowering. It was a period when the economy was recovering after the dot com crisis 
and accumulated capital flows from technology bubble directed to rapid growing housing 
market. Hence, the loan portfolio of West Georgia was mainly focused on acquisition, 
development, and construction (ADC) which brought higher return at that time. Before 
bankruptcy the bank had 90%57 of real estate loans out of total portfolio. When the 
situation on mortgage market was heating up the Bank’s Board of Directors did not manage 
and control risks raised from the real estate loans properly thus, exacerbating the bank 
performance and speeding up the  bank failure.  
Initially, the bank business strategy concentration was toward gradual developing ADC loans 
as a component of commercial real estate (CRE) portfolio. However, from 2005, West 
Georgia started to actively implement the ADC loan growth strategy. It can be observed 
from the chart below how ADC loans as a component of CRE portfolio increased more than 
three times reaching the highest volume of 83.1 $ million between 2005 and 2007. The 
concentration of ADC loans increased from 217% of total capital to 420% 58in 2008, 
enhancing the bank’s vulnerability to shocks in real estate market. From the loan and leases 
report can be concluded that ADC loans amounted to 42% of total loan portfolio. Moreover, 
the examiners stated that more than 90% of the bank’s 20$ million portfolio of single family 
residential construction loans were speculative as the houses that were constructed were 
not pre-sold59. 
 
                                                          
56 Data is taken from  bank’s financial statement reports“Schedule RC E Deposit Liabilites”, Memoranda 
57Data is taken from bank’s financial statement reports,  Schedule RCCI Part I. Loans and Leases, 
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/viewreport.aspx?ibnid=usa_3119163&per=20090331&rpt=RCCI
&typ=html 
58 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community Bank of West 
Georgia”, Office of Inspector General, January 2010, p. 12 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/MRL_west_Georgia.htm 
59 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community Bank of West 
Georgia”, Office of Inspector General, January 2010, p. 
16http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/MRL_west_Georgia.htm 
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Growth in ADC loans 
 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Material Loss Review of Community 
Bank of West Georgia”, Office of Inspector General, January 2010, p.10, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/MRL_west_Georgia.htm 
The bank performance according to CAMELS rating was deteriorating substantially, because 
level of capital was not adequate to sustain the bank’s risk profile, assets quality was 
deteriorating and earnings were critically deficient because of increase in loan loss provision 
expenses due to poor asset quality. Liquidity was a concern as the asset quality was 
deteriorating and the bank relied mainly on brokered deposits60. Brokered deposit is a 
deposit which was initially sold by different banks to brokerage who then distribute the 
parts of mixed pool of deposits to their customers. West Georgia was a customer of 
brokerage who was supplying the bank with deposits. During the crisis, with rising number 
of financial institution failures, relying on brokered deposits becoming more risky. So, the 
bank’s overall rating was “4”, by March 2008 meaning “troubled condition”. This rating was 
decreased to “5” when Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and state examined West Georgia in 
September 2008. The bank was warned to improve the performance by injecting the capital 
to the level of being cited “adequately capitalized”. However, West Georgia did not 
implement the recommendations and was closed in June 2009. So, the West Georgia was 
failed in result of concentration ADC loans in lending portfolio; the Board’s oversight in loan 
underwriting and credit administration, and Board’s reluctance to maintain the level of 
capital commensurate with rising risks. 
                                                          
60 “...in 1989, Congress began restricting insured institutions’s access to brokered deposits, and by 1991, only 
well-capitalized institutions could accept brokered deposits without restrictions”, Supervisory insights, “ 
Liquidity Analysis: Decades of Change”, FDIC Training Center: 1992. 
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Having looked at two banks profile we can infer that the failure in both cases was due to the 
high concentration of real estate loans in a portfolio and weak loan underwriting 
requirements concurrent with their negative consequences that abruptly emerged as the 
crisis happened. An inadequate level of capital and earning deficiency are accompanying 
with poor asset quality.   
 
Georgia Primary Bank 
Now we are approaching the sample of banks that also faced with bad market economic 
conditions, but could withstand them with in contrast to the banks discussed above. The 
two banks that are going to be discussed in this part could overcome the financial distress 
spelled severely on banking Georgian sector and function till present due to the government 
financial assistance received mainly through TARP program. We are going to understand the 
difference in bank performance of failed banks and those that were bailed out. Georgia 
Primary Bank and One Georgia Bank are the financial institutions to be discussed below. The 
information important for the analysis will be traced back to the period before banks 
receiving the government assistance. Georgia Primary Bank got support on May 1, 2009 and 
One Georgia Bank on May 8, 2009.  
Georgia Primary Bank is a nonmember state chartered commercial bank regulated by FDIC 
opened in 2007 with 1 branch within the state and 19 employees on March 31, 2009. The 
main financial facts of balance sheet as of March 31, 2009 are presented below in the table 
and displayed in the chart. 
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Sources:http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/viewreport.aspx?ibnid=usa_3442704&per=20
090331&rpt=RC&typ=html, http://www.faqs.org/banks/Georgia-Primary-Bank-58523-Atlanta-
Georgia.html#top 
It can be noticed from the table that the equity capital comprised 11.6% out of total loan 
portfolio. The bank had only 11.6% of cushion to pay back depositors in case it was losing 
money. Notwithstanding the fact the capital was not increasing from 2007 till 2009 and the 
volume of assets were mainly expanded in 2009 for an account of deposits, the key ratios, 
such as Tier 1 leverage Ratio, Tier 1 Risk-based Capital ratio and total risk based capital ratio 
satisfied the requirements to be cited as well capitalized. The Net Income of Georgia 
47 
 
Primary Bank by March 31, 2009 totaled 0.247$61 million, demonstrating the bank 
profitability. In contrast to failed banks where net losses eroded the capital equity, Georgia 
Primary Bank slightly increased it. To measure how liquid the bank’s assets were and the 
bank ability to pay its short-term obligations we use the quick ratio indicator (Current 
assets/current liabilities, current assets = cash and balances due from depository institutions 
+ securities (42.773$ million) and current liabilities = short-term deposits (146, 28862$ 
million)) equals 0.3, meaning that the bank could not pay its current liabilities.  
As all banks were focused on real estate lending when the market for it was flowering, the 
total loan portfolio of Georgia Primary Bank was also growing, rising from 34.45$ million to 
181.33$ million, increasing by 526% in two years. (See Chart below) The amount of loans 
before the bank was bailed out reached the peak. According to the Schedule RCCI Part I. 
Loans and Leases report the proportion of ADC and CRE loans in total loan portfolio 
comprised 100.782$ million or 55.5%, whereas the other proportion (44.5%) were given to 
commercial and industry (C&I) loans. The share of other loans was negligible. Although the 
proportion of troubled assets was not so high as that in the banks which failed, the Board of 
Directors could have limited it number to minimum taking into consideration the financial 
situation on real estate market at that time, as the bank was founded when the crisis 
flashed. 
The growth trend of total assets, total loans and total deposits 
Financial Data ($) 3/31/2009 3/31/2008 12/31/2007 
Total Assets $229.72  $73.78  $53.02  
Total Loans $181.33  $61.12  $34.45  
Total Deposits $208.32  $52.75  $33.26  
 
Source:http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/viewreport.aspx?ibnid=usa_3646397&per=200
90331&rpt=RI&typ=html 
 
Thus, it can be seen from overall bank performance that the Capital - met the adequately 
capitalized requirements; Assets – the quality was not poor, as almost half of them were 
                                                          
61 Data from the bank financial statement, Schedule RI Income Statement, 
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/viewreport.aspx?ibnid=usa_3646397&per=20090331&rpt=RI&ty
p=html 
62 The data is taken from  bank financial statement “Schedule RC E Deposit Liabilites”, Memoranda 
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commercial and industrial loans; Management – although we did not find relevant 
information concerning management team, we tend to think that the management 
performance was normal: If it was good, they could prevent the equal share of real estate 
loans in total portfolio, if it was poor, the net income would have been negative. Earnings– 
sufficient, net income is positive and did not eat away the capital equity. Liquidity was 
deficient as many banks of that time experienced this problem. 
Notwithstanding the fact the bank performance was in good condition, to further withstand 
the financial downturn the government provided the entity with 4.5$ 63million through 
TARP program in exchange for preferred stock and exercised warrants. The Bank has not 
returned any part of this sum yet. 
 
One Georgia Bank 
The next receiver of federal assistance is One Georgia Bank. This Bank is a Georgia chartered 
nonmember commercial bank with one branch office and 27 employees was founded in 
2006. We will examine the main financial figures prior the bailout, i.e. March 31, 2009. 
Below is given the table with important financial facts about the Bank. 
  
                                                          
63 http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/entities/594-georgia-primary-bank 
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Source: http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_3442704, 
http://www.faqs.org/banks/One-Georgia-Bank-58238-Atlanta-Georgia.html#top 
Based on the financial data from the table we can conclude that One Georgia Bank equity 
capital was able to cover 10.45% of total loans. From the chart above it can be clearly seen 
that the absolute capital volume almost did not change from 2006 till 2009, while assets and 
liabilities were growing. Despite this fact the key capital ratios satisfied the requirements to 
be well-capitalized. Net income was negative, but in comparison with failed banks it was not 
so high. Bank’s unprofitability was reflected in negative ROA and ROE ratios. Liquidity 
indicator equaled: cash ((0.66$ million) + securities (40.515$ million))/short-term deposits 
(154.616$ 64million) =0.26, the indicator was on the extreme low level, leaving the bank no 
chances to meet the short-term liabilities.  
Let’s look at loan portfolio composition of One Georgia Bank. The real estate loans 
represented 83% out of total loan portfolio, while commercial and industrial loans only 
15.7%. The high proportion of real estate loans made the bank vulnerable to situation on 
mortgage market during the crisis. Unfortunately, because of insufficient historical 
information we cannot track the trends of loan growth. 
So, we can conclude that Capital of the Bank – adequately capitalized, Assets – the 
proportion of troubled real estate loans were high; Management – did not control the risk 
arisen from the high proportion of real estate loans; Earnings – deficient, due to poor 
                                                          
64 The data is taken from  bank financial statement “Schedule RC E Deposit Liabilites”, Memoranda 
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performance of assets quality, although the net losses were not so high as it was in 
compared failed banks; Liquidity – deficient. 
Although the bank performance was not good enough, the government helped One Georgia 
Bank with providing 5.5$ 65million. In comparison with Georgia Primary bank, One Georgia 
bank had poorer performance and higher share of troubled assets, therefore the federal 
assistance through TARP program was one million more.  
So, we have looked at 4 commercial banks with different portfolio composition and 
capitalization. Based on research made above we can conclude why the first two banks were 
not supported and failed and the other two due to government assistance operate till 
present. Below we provide the comparison analysis of main financial indicators of discussed 
banks. It can be clearly seen that two first banks had a great share of real estate loans in 
their portfolios and did not have enough capital to cover the emerging losses from infected 
assets. The two other banks that were bailed out had a rating of well- capitalized banks. It 
means that these banks could withstand further loan losses due to its capital. Although One 
Georgia Bank had a large proportion of real estate loans in its portfolio, even larger than 
Rockbridge Commercial Bank had it received the government support.  All 4 banks 
experienced liquidity problems. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the banks that were well-capitalized received the assistance 
despite the high proportion of troubled assets in its portfolio. The bailed out banks just were 
given the government support to resist to dire economic conditions. It is worth noting that 
                                                          
65  http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/entities/594-georgia-primary-bank 
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being on the edge of failure the bank was either bailed out or merged and taken over by big 
market players. If the bank was allowed to fail and no acquirer wanted to purchase it, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was responsible for insured deposits at failed 
banks and was interested in finding the buyer for the failed institution. It is worth noting 
that the volume of bailout provided to Georgia Primary Bank and One Georgia Bank was not 
as high as losses associated with bank failure. The volume of bailout in relation to total 
equity 21.3% and 25.8% respectively, while to total assets was 1.92% and 2.24% 
respectively. The thesis shows only 2 banks whose assets were not given to fail, whereas the 
total number of TARP bailout recipients, the financial institutions and car companies of 
different sizes were around 100066. In case these banks had not been helped, the situation 
on banking sector and on real market, which are interconnected, could have been much 
more severe: more banks failures, credit freeze and deflation. So, the bailouts were 
necessary, as without them relapse of Great Depression would have been inevitable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index 
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Chapter 3.  Pros and cons of bailouts, other bailout alternatives.  
 
3.1. Pros and cons of bailouts. 
Notwithstanding the fact the financial system was bailed out and banking activities returned 
not to the same level but are on the rising trend, there are a lot of arguments why bailouts 
are a bad strategy. First of all, many Americans kept on struggling financially after the 
bailout strategy was started, while banks and financial institutions recovered quickly. A 
number of homeowners lost their homes and were not helped as fast as the banks received 
the support. So, the growing loss of public trust in government may undermine the 
government reputation not only among Americans but also on international arena.  Second, 
the bailouts generate the moral hazard problem, if the financial institutions were not 
concerned about their high risk weighted portfolio before the crisis and instead of going 
bankrupt they are helped to overcome the downswing, it gives the incentive for taking more 
risks in the future relying on government assistance in bust cycles. This government support 
may be reflected by excessive risk taking not necessarily in banking sector, but also in other 
industries. So, there is a high probability of permanent future crises, unless the government 
takes measures to control the spending bailout money and strengthen the regulation. Third, 
bailouts destroy the competition conditions on the market. If the US economy rest on 
laissez-faire system, where is assumed that the government does not interfere in business 
and where somebody wins and somebody loses, bankruptcy should be an active stage of a 
entity life cycle, without them market players will not have responsibility for their actions.  
Fourth argument against bailout is inflation and its anticipation. The rise of inflation is 
expected in the long-term run in the US and in the countries whose currency is pegged to 
the US dollar, and national debt.  The underlying asset under this unstable debt will rise in 
value at the inflation rate of 7-30 %67 annually (it depends on the index of inflation; M3 or 
price of gold) because of quantitative easing that is far greater than the discount rate 
charged by the Fed. However, besides long-run expectation of inflation, there is the market 
                                                          
67 http://www.fskrealityguide.blogspot.com/2008/03/bear-stearns-bailout-details.html 
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anticipation of inflation which is much worse than the inflation itself, since the inflation 
anticipation will demand the higher interest rate for received dollar repayments in order to 
compensate for the reduced US currency value; the higher interest rate in its term will boost 
the government deficit and debt, creating the restrain in government spending before 
resuming the normal healthy economic growth. But the fear of inflation will not appear as a 
real threat till the unemployment rate is high. So, the decision to the financial crisis has 
been chosen, now it is time for the government to contemplate the ways of addressing the 
consequences of adopted decision. 
3.2. Were there better bailout alternatives? 
Some economists claim that, the resolution of the US government to bailout gigantic banks 
and firms was not the best alternative in order to resume lending, which was one of the 
main problems in the financial system restoration. It is considered that there is a high 
probability that this bailout can give rise to too-big-to fail enterprises and even more costly 
bailouts in the future, since government encouraged and forced banks to be taken over and 
merged. To name but just a few: Merrill Lynch was forced to be taken over by Bank of 
America, the same situation can be observed with JP Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns, Wells 
Fargo and Wachovia, where the Bear Stearns and Wachovia were acquired by larger 
institutions. 
During the crisis due to suspension of payments and lending, the real market price on the 
assets is blurred making it difficult to assess the value of banks’ assets and their losses. Bank 
bailouts are supposed to rescue the banks that engender the systemic risk, mainly too-big-
to fail banks and too-interconnected to fail however, the financial system is too 
interconnected by itself and has the same banking characteristics making the bailout 
scheme ineffective and superficial. It is worth noting that although the interconnectedness 
caused and spread contagion, it is one of the achievements of economic effectiveness as 
Charles Calomiris cites, allowing both banks and firms work cooperatively more efficiently 
and benefiting to society so, interconnectedness should not be eliminated, but the thing 
that can cure the system is transparency which will allow market participants form their 
expectations and valuations adequately. The crisis is like a serious illness which needs to be 
cured entirely, resuming the strong immunity to subsequent crises; otherwise the financial 
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system will experience permanent outburst of bust cycles. The scientists and economists 
suppose that the financial situation in the US provides rather strong evidence for this: US 
will face chronic crises, the consequences of the bailout treatment. It is unknown how 
severe next crises can be and whether it will be possible to choose the other exit from it 
than that which was chosen during the recent turmoil or impossible to turn away from 
already chosen way. 
Some economists adhere to the opinion of financial restructuring in the way of 
conservatorship or debt-to equity conversion. In this case the creditor receives the equity 
stake in the entity against the full or partial termination of the debt part depending on the 
management team negotiations. This modified capital structure improves the balance sheet 
solvency of debtors and creditors and solves the debt service problems. The creditors are 
suggested the share of future revenues in exchange for the write-off their debt. This 
solution is not always suitable for the creditors, since the shares price of the company fell 
significantly due to the financial crisis; however, this is one of the best solutions for the 
creditors, they can control the management team and participate in company decisions, 
rather than waiting for the debt repayments, which might be hardly probable. Debt to 
equity conversion could also be applied for the government being the main equity holder. 
When a financial institution is in the zone of failure, i.e. have fewer assets than liabilities and 
low capital, it should be shut down and nationalized instead of using the bulky of taxpayers’ 
money. The government becomes the temporary owner of the bank; takes control over the 
banking operations and run it until someone takes it over or buys. This method of debt to 
equity conversion with government equity stake was applied to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac entities, the institutions that provide credits guarantees for almost half of all US 
outstanding residential mortgage loans. When these large institutions experienced the 
significant losses on their mortgage-related guarantees and investments, the government 
took control of them in September 2008. This method requires much less taxpayers’ money, 
increases the institution overall value, decreases the bankruptcy probability and 
consequently save the bankrupt transaction costs. The government just assists in rekindling 
the lending process and should put the entity on the way to function independently when 
the economic activities restore. 
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The other way of liabilities transformation is conversion of unsecured liabilities into equity. 
In this case the load taken from recapitalization is carrying by those who initiated unsecured 
loans and by banks which bear these unsecured loans on its balances. This way allows the 
players to observe the transparency in the market by monitoring the transactions. 
Also one of the suggested ways was to bail out the special entity which would have bought 
up the entire pool of the mortgage backed securities thus, cleaning up the banks’ balance 
sheet and have held them until the system would stabilize.  The means of functioning would 
have provided by the Fed as long-term interest free loans and the whole subprime mortgage 
market would be frozen till the better market conditions would come. The first difference 
between the current bailout is that in the case of bailing out only one entity, Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac, for example, which was directly connected with the subprime mortgage 
market, where the crisis happened, instead of many different entities without concrete 
criteria for supporting them. Second, if even the taxpayers’ money were involved they could 
be given the preferred shares of the equity and appropriate control rights on this special 
entity. Third, people could keep their homes, which is much more important from the social 
point of view. 
Issuing new equity in the old banks or creating new banks with new equity (the government 
could have bought banks for the price much below the assets value to stop them going 
bankrupt, recapitalize them and sell them off for much higher price) is the next way of 
economy recapitalization. Conventional wisdom has it that the engine of any economy is 
small banks, since small sized banks are the main link for credit for small and medium sized 
enterprises, where are created the major number of working places. Ashcraft cites that 
small banks are mainly directed lending to small firms which are more bank-dependent68. 
The statistics proves that in the US before the crisis from 1990 till 2003 small firms were the 
major source of new jobs creation. (See Chart 20).  Moreover, small banks process soft 
information and manage informational complex credits much easier than large banks do69 
                                                          
68 Ashcraft, Adam, (2005), “Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy 
banks”, American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 5., p.7 
69 Berger, Allen N., Miller, Nathan H., Petersen, Mitchell A., Rajan, Raghuram G., and Stein, Jeremy C., (2005), 
“Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 237–269. 
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and the monitoring of less concentrated financial system with many small banks is much 
easier and effective than concentrated financial system with few big banks70. But it is wrong 
to claim that the government should prevent the appearance of too-big-to-fail entities in 
the future. The emergence of big banks is a success of market economy, where economy of 
scale, expenses minimizing and profit maximizing purposes are reached. Furthermore, only 
big banks with substantial level of capital can employ investments in innovation and 
technology. However, after the crisis, the economy is on the bottom of economic growth, so 
to resume the growth the creation of new small companies is indispensable. So, the 
tendency should be directed to create the healthier financial structure, than it was before, 
with thorough elaborated criteria and standards for how mitigate the risk portfolios. 
Chart 20 
 
3.3. Bailouts were inevitable 
Despite the fact that mentioned above arguments against bailouts are reasonable and 
suggested other alternatives are sound and maybe possible the government did not want to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
70  Centre for economic Policy Research (CEPR) “Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition”. 
An analysis of state-supported schemes for financial institutions by 2010, p.19 
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risk by crossing out the economy formed by centuries and by letting Americans to be on the 
edge of starvation. So, the government did not have the other option during the crisis, but 
bailout the banks, the main providers of financial sources to other industries and the key 
propellers of economic growth. The volume of assets of current financial institutions is such 
big that letting them go to the bottom would have affected the economic conditions of 
many households and other industries. Although the government should not intervene in 
business cycle of companies, it could not allow them to fail, as the consequences could be 
far worse than those during the Great Depression. The volume of transactions and the 
amount of assets and liabilities of current financial institutions exceeded more than 
thousand times those that were in 1930s. We know from history the negative effects of 
depression: high unemployment, budget deficit, very strong deflationary pressures and slow 
economic growth, during the Great Depression the US real GDP fell by more than 30 %71. 
With the continuing growth of unemployment the real danger was deflation. Deflation can 
be a serious problem, as the wages and prices are falling households and enterprises can 
pay off their debts less actively. These can lead to more defaults and chaos exacerbating the 
overleveraged financial system even more. Moreover, the process of economy stabilizing 
after the Great depression did not occur in 3-4 years, it took around 10 and more years. 
Therefore, it is clearly that bank bailouts were indispensable; actually it was the economy 
bailout to avoid the consequences of far 30’s. One of the major advantages of the bailout in 
the short-term is the confidence restoration accompanied by lending stimulation. Besides, 
as the research in chapter 2 indicates that the government did not support the banks with 
overall poor conditions and low capitalization level, the government gave a helping hand to 
those that were well-capitalized, despite having a high proportion of troubled assets in loan 
portfolio.  Furthermore, the bailouts did not let the unemployment rate fall too low. 
Imagine, if big troubled financial institutions, where several thousands of people are 
employed were allowed to fail, how fast the unemployment rate would have risen. This fact 
confirms again that the federal assistance was vital during the recent economic catastrophe. 
Moreover, it essential noting that Pension funds had equity stakes in many big institutions, 
it means that people own a bank stock in the form of their pension plans, so letting big 
institution fail could have caused Americans all classes from low to high to suffer. So, using 
                                                          
71 Christian D. Romer, “Great Depression”, Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia Britannica, December 20, 2003., 
p.1 
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taxpayers’ money was in favor of American people, they were just bailing out themselves.   
However, it is understandable that government cannot bail out the financial institution all 
the time. So, special procedures on macro and micro level should be addressed in order to 
prevent further turmoil.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this thesis was to explore the key reasons that caused the financial crisis in 
the US. The composition of general US macroeconomic factors, such as loose monetary 
policy, in composition to poor credit history requirements by vast majority of financial 
institutions and accumulated capital after dot com crisis led to growth of housing market 
and housing prices; low savings rate that gave the opportunity to foreign capital inflow, 
particularly from China to reside in the US mortgage-backed market; and rising trade deficit 
because of high consumption rate. Borrowers were eager to take more loans in the hope of 
further housing price increase and the opportunity to cash refinancing. More than half of 
originated loans were for this purpose. The greed to receive higher returns created the 
mortgage-backed market, which allowed spreading risks among investors and taking more 
leverage and risks. All mentioned above factors contributed to housing bubble development 
which burst and transformed into financial crisis in 2007.  
As the volume of troubled securities in bank loan portfolios was tremendous, leaving the 
financial institution to default could lead to more severe consequences than bailing them 
out. The government in addition to application of conventional and unconventional 
monetary tools initiated the troubled relief program (TARP) which helped banks to clear 
their balance sheets and gave the opportunity to withstand dire economic conditions. This 
thesis concluded that not all banks received the government assistance, only those that 
were well capitalized, notwithstanding the fact that had a significant weight of troubled 
assets in loan portfolio, negative profitability ratios and low liquidity indicators. The 
government helped such institutions to overcome the crisis without eroding its capital by 
covering growing losses from troubled assets. The government let the banks fail, if the level 
of capitalization was critically low. The probability and the speed of their bankruptcy were 
much greater and highly anticipated than in those banks that had enough capital. Therefore, 
the federal assistance was directed to support the level of bank capital that despite rising 
losses still could meet the capital requirements. If the government would not have helped, 
the banking system would stop functioning and the economy would fall in Depression with 
high unemployment rate and negative economic growth. Despite the number of bailout 
disadvantages such as the soaring likelihood of further reliance on government in time of 
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crisis and further high risk taking, high inflation in the long run and competition distortion, 
the recent bailout strategy was inevitable. 
However, government should take measures on macro level to prevent further financial 
crisis. This crisis demonstrated that the economies are globally interconnected: the 
subprime housing crisis in the US made big economies fell on downward economic trend 
also. Hence, the measures to exit from financial crisis should be taken in cooperation with 
major economies, particularly the US, China and Europe.   
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Source: The Board of  Federal System “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”, 
Supervision and regulation section 5. 
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